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RUMINATIONS ON THE ROLE OF FAULT IN
THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF TORTS*
Wex S. Malone**
Any attempt to assign negligence its proper role in the his-
tory of tort law must be deferred until a determination of the
role that fault in any of its varieties played in early law. Even this
deferment does not lead us back far enough, for we must also
ask whether we can isolate a distinct role for tort law itself in
the dawn of the history of the common law. The answer here must
be clearly, No, if by "torts" we mean some sort of organized
scheme for determining when and under what conditions the
monetary costs of a harm suffered by one person should be
shifted to the shoulders of another by means of some authori-
tative order. The very prospect of a civil suit for damages pre-
supposes a sophistication that simply did not exist in the
earliest half-organized legal societies.
ANGLO-SAXON PROCEEDING FOR BOT AND WITE
The primordial seed from which both crime and tort were
to germinate was the blood feud that was characteristic of any
barbaric society organized along the lines of blood kinship. The
defense of the honor of the clan by resort to warfare against
the harm-inflicting outsider and his entire kin was a traditional
practice with roots deep in the need for survival of the family
unit. The outrage that cried for revenge lay not so much in the
desire to enforce atonement for the bodily harm inflicted upon
the wounded family member as in the humiliation that was
suffered by his entire kin group. The primary object of law was
to provide a substitute for the feud; and, as would be expected,
the remedy that eventually emerged was of a character calcu-
lated to offer balm where the hurt was deepest-in the clan's
profound sense of indignity.'
By the time Anglo-Saxon history had reached the period
for which we have dependable records a definite ranking of per-
sons in terms of their political or group standing had become
* This article Is a rewritten version of a study prepared by the author
under a commission of the Federal Department of Transportation, which
appears in a monograph, OIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIoENcE AcTIoN,
GPO-cat. no. TD 1.17:N 31, March 1970.
** Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines,
27 H&Rv. L. REV. 195, 198 (1914).
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recognized. Accordingly, when retribution in terms of money
was offered as a substitute for clan vengeance, there emerged a
definite schedule or tariff establishing the wer, the official money
worth of all persons, and this wer depended principally upon
rank. Furthermore, once the money award was made, the ac-
cepted apportionment of the wer among the injured person's
relatives was in prescribed allowances to his paternal and
maternal kin, since clan involvement was the most important
consideration. Thus both the amount of the wer itself and the
system of its distribution were faithful reflections of an affront
to clan dignity-a matter wholly foreign to any sense of a need
for reparation as envisioned in modern law.
This same demand for appeasement of the sense of honor
was manifested in non-fatal injuries. Here the amount of the
tariff to be paid was determined to a large extent by the public
shame that attended the wound. According to the laws of Ethel-
bert: "If the bruise be black in a part not covered by the clothes,
let bot be made with thirty scaetts. If it be covered by the
clothes, let bot be made for each with twenty scaetts." Pound
refers to a provision of Howell the Good, King of the Welsh, to
the effect that a scar on the face is worth six score pence, whereas
the permanent loss of both joints of the thumb (an injury that
would virtually disable the hand) brought only seventy-six
pence and a half-penny.2
The early history of the attempted suppression of the feud
by government and the emergence of a system of composition
under royal order is shrouded in uncertainty. We may safely
assume that any distinction between crime and tort was un-
known.3 The earliest exactions of payment were made in a
single proceeding which served the dual purpose both of buying
off the vengeful anger of the clan and of placating the king or
lord for the disturbance of his peace or mund. The person suc-
cessfully charged with an offense settled with the injured victim
or his clan by a payment of bot and through the same proceeding
he appeased the king by a payment of wite. The bot for homi-
cide was the equivalent of the wer of'the person slain.4
Although the bot and wer have long disappeared, they have
impressed their characteristics, not only on the criminal law,
2. Id. at 202.
3. J. LAUGHLIN, THE ANGLO-SAXoN PROCEDURE, ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW
183, 265 (1876).
4. Id. at 278.
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but also upon conceptions of causation and fault in civic actions
which were to emerge much later. Hence these primitive notions
deserve our attention.
Considering that the primary purpose for the exaction of
bot was appeasement of the clan urge for revenge, one might
expect that the demand for bot would be limited to those dra-
matic situations where the offender had inflicted a direct injury
or death through glaring theatric violence. However, as Pollock
and Maitland observe,5 all the evidence points the other way.
In situations where modern law would tend to ignore the de-
fendant's participation because of its remote relationship to
the wounding or death, the ancient tribunal apparently did not
hestitate nevertheless to rule in favor of the victim and his
family. Certainly this was true in the case of homicide, where
the accused was expected to swear that he had done nothing
whereby the dead man was "further from life and nearer to
death."
"At your request I accompany you when you are about
your own affairs; my enemies fall upon and kill me, you
must pay for my death. You take me to see a wild beast
show or that interesting spectacle, a mad man; beast or
mad man kills me; you must pay. You hang up your sword;
someone else knocks it down so that it cuts me; you must
pay. In none of these cases can you honestly swear that you
did nothing that helped to bring about death or wound."
The fact that primordial law was thus apparently content
to recognize even the most remote causal connection as being
sufficient to justify the imposition of penalty suggests strongly
an equal indifference toward matters of fault or blameworthi-
ness on the part of the person against whom the proceedings
were instituted. This view of the wholly amoral character of
early law is supported by most writers,7 but not unqualifiedly
by all.8
5. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 468 (1895).
6. Leg. Hen. 88, § 9. See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 468 (1895).
7. See the list of authorities cited by W. PROSSER, THE LAw Or TORTS 17,
n.616 (3d ed. 1964).
8. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed in THE COMMON LAW (Howe ed.
1963, Lect. I) that appeals for personal violence appeared even in early his-
tory to have been confined to intentional wrongs. A modified view of this
thesis will be found in T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW




Further evidence of the willingness of early law to exact
its penalty without regard to moral guilt or innocence is afforded
by the familiar institution of the deodand. Side by side with its
willingness to condemn persons to the payment of wer for deaths
traceable only remotely to their conduct was the demand of
archaic law that its vengence also be visited upon the immediate
visible cause of death even though this agency were only a slave,
an animal, or even an inanimate object. The "bane" (slayer)
may be an ox, a sword, or perhaps a cart, a boat, or a millwheel.9
Apparently it was not even clearly required that the offending
object be in motion, although Bracton would distinguish be-
tween the tree that falls and the tree against which a man is
thrown.10 The disposition to be made of the offending beast or
object appears to vary with the period, the community, and
even with the nature of the thing itself. It is probable that in
the earliest times the offending bane was handed over to the
victim or his family for destruction or to be used as it saw fit."
The idea of attaint was deep in barbaric consciousness. The
owner was under an obligation immediately to put the con-
demned sword, mill stone, or plow share aside abandoned and
unused under penalty of harboring the killer. Later the notion
of deodand involved the surrender of the offending object to the
king to be devoted to pious uses for the appeasing of God's
wrath.'2
In appraising the role or absence of any role of blameworthi-
ness in early law the legal predicament of one who happened
to be the owner of an offending animal or object is of particular
9. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 10 (1963); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 471 (1895).
10. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 472, n.6 (1895).
11. See, e.g., ExoDus, ch. 12, verse 28. See generally 0. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 10 (1963).
12. 2 POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 471 (1895). The
notion of noxal surrender has persisted in law with amazing stubbornness.
The deodand was not abolished in England until 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 62).
Four years earlier, and at a time when the taking of human life was still not
recognized as an actionable tort, a deodand was imposed against a locomotive
whose operation had resulted in the loss of four lives. The redemption value
of the locomotive assessed against its corporate owner was fixed at 125
pounds. Regina v. Eastern Counties Ry., 10 M. & W. 56, 152 Eng. Rep. 380
(1842). Even today the Louisiana Civil Code contains a relic of the deodand
in a provision that the owner of a trespassing animal may fully discharge
himself from liability by abandoning the offending creature to the person
who has sustained injury. Thus, in that state any person may find himself
the inadvertent owner of a wandering cow through noxal surrender. LA. Civ.
CODE art. 2321.
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interest. It is agreed on all sides that the owner was compelled
to hand over the offender. Pollock and Maitland regard the ac-
quittal of the owner of any further responsibility upon his sur-
render of the object as a mitigation of even older law which
would have subjected him to penalty on the basis of his mere
ownership or harboring of the bane'8 (killer). On the other hand,
Holmes insists that the primary desire of the community was
to obtain surrender of the offending object or animal, and the
law's only concern with the owner was to secure possession of
the object from him. Hence his obligation to pay was only a
means of forcing him to deliver.14 However this may be, the
fact remained that early law was entirely willing to attribute
responsibility to senseless objects and to vent its outrage upon
them, thus betraying clearly that within the barbaric conscious-
ness there was little concern with refined notions of a liability
dependent upon wrongdoing.
TRIAL AS RITUAL
Along with this early tendency toward superstitious attri-
bution of responsibility goes the ancient practice of recourse
to ritual as the accepted mode of trial. The oath and the ordeal
far antedate any serious attempt to fix facts through the pro-
duction of testimony. Even before the time of the Appeal of
Felony with its formalistic offer of trial by battle (to be dis-
cussed later) guilt was affixed or erased through resort to the
solemn rite of compurgation. This was a formal procedure where-
in oath helpers (to the apostolic number of twelve), who were
known as consacromentales, swore merely to the purity of the
oath of not guilty which had been previously given by the
accused.' 5 Apparently it was assumed that a man who could
procure this many good neighbors must be in good repute. If the
person charged could not manage to secure compurgation, the
last resort for determining responsibility lay in the judgment
of God, or the ordeal. The function of the ordeal was that of an
oracle through which divine truth was revealed. The familiar
ordeals of fire, of water, and of morsel have been described
13. 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY O ENGLISH LAW 470 (1895).
14. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 12 (Howe ed. 1963); see also G. WnI-
LIAMS, LIABILITY FOn ANIMALS 186 (1939).




many times1 3 and need not be elaborated here. It is sufficient to
observe that the ritualistic character of the early trial should
be accepted as further evidence that the object of primordial
law was to appeal to the dramatic sense of the community and
keep the peace by publicly appeasing the dignity of the offended
family. At this time it was still far too early to think of trial
as a serious effort to ascertain the precise facts so that blame-
worthiness could be established, even if the determination of
fault had been a recognized end of law.
SEPARATION OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC WRONG-
A NEW ROLE FOR FAULT IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Eventually the functions of appeasement of the family
through an assessment of bot and of atonement for the breach
of the King's peace through the condemnation to pay wite
begin to draw apart, and each of the two reparations begins to
acquire its own peculiar characteristics. It is with reference to
these newly emerging distinctions that we find the first clear
suggestion that fault, or absence of fault, may have a role to
play. As matters developed, the full wer must still be paid to the
outraged family irrespective of whether the homicide was in-
tended or unintended - whether it was innocent or blame-
worthy. However, if the person who anticipated a homicide
charge did not wait for an accusation but proclaimed what he
had done and succeeded in establishing that there was nis-
adventure, he may escape the payment of wite. Here, then, is
the first suggestion of what will develop later as a separate
system of criminal law which punishes the guilty but which
gradually comes to exonerate the slayer who can offer an ac-
ceptable moral justification. In contrast, it should be emphasized
that there is no tendency whatsover to relax the traditional
requirement that the wer (civil reparation) must be paid ir-
respective of moral innocence on the part of the accused.
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SCHEDULED TARIFFS
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE APPEAL OF FELONY
For present purposes there is no need to explore the reasons
that account for the rather sudden disappearance of the old
16. The ordeals are described In detail in 4d. at 301. They were abolished
In 1215 by the Lateran Council which refused to accord religious sanction to
the ordeal. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY or ENGLISH
LAw 596 (1895).
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system of the preappointed bot and wite. Pollock and Maitland
suggest that the complete lack of flexibility in the old scheme
and the onerousness of the tariffs, which left out of account the
offender's ability to pay, were among the reasons.' 7 Somewhat in
substitution for the ancient wite there has emerged the Appeal
of Felony in the Twelfth Century, but payment of the wer of
the victim has come to an end. Certain offenses gradually came
to be regarded as unemendable. Homicide, for example, could
no longer be forgiven by procuring the satisfaction of the clan
through the payment of wer.'5 In contrast, the conception of
the restoration of the King's peace, which had been procured
in the old proceeding by the payment of wite, became greatly
expanded in scope. It was necessary to set apart for separate
and more severe treatment those disorders which demanded the
most serious attention of the King's justices. Thus there de-
veloped the first of what may be regarded roughly as a true
criminal proceeding, the Appeal of Felony, in which the life
or limb of the wrongdoer was at stake. It is interesting to note
that the Appeal was initiated by a charge and challenge to battle
prosecuted by the offended person or his family.1 Yet, although
the processes of law were set in motion by him or them through
the Appeal, there is no evidence that any monetary award to
the victims was ever recognized.20 No claim for compensation
was to come into existence until the eventual emergence of the
modern suit for damages through the action of trespass.
MISADVENTURE AS BASIS FOR PARDON IN APPEAL OF FELONY
It is in the criminal Appeal of Felony that we find the first
indication that some regard for the moral aspect of the prose-
cution might be manifested by the courts. The process, however,
was slow. The two major pretensions of innocence-self-defense
and misadverture-were not at first available as pleas which,
once established, could serve to forestall a conviction. At as
late a time as the reign of Henry III the established fact that
the accused killed through pure unavoidable accident (mis-
17. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 460 (1895).
18. See the account in id.
19. Id. at 461.
20. "The reading of several thousand 12th and 18th century cases from
1199 up till the time that the action of trespass became established has failed
to reveal a single instance of damages recovered in an appeal." Woodbine,
The Orig4ns of the Action of Trespass, 33 YAI.e L.J. 799, 801 (1934).
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adventure) or in defense of his own life served merely to jus-
tify a recommendation to the king's mercy for a pardon.21
For present purposes misadventure (infortunium) holds a
special interest for us. One might suspect at first glance that
this term suggests the presence of reasonable behavior on the
part of the person charged with crime and, as such, it may have
served as a forerunner of the notion of negligence, which de-
veloped later. However, misadventure was a term used merely
to ground a recommendation for the exercise of royal discre-
tion.22 Consequently it was little more than a convenient label
to be affixed whenever a pardon had been decided upon. The
same term was also used to indicate those appeals that failed
because the death could not in any way be attributed to the
agency of the defendant, and where, for that reason, the only
available remedy was to exact a deodand.
Although no monetary award was available to the victim
or his family under an Appeal, Woodbine points out that the
power of the family to initiate an Appeal carried with it an
accompanying competence to compromise. It is probable that
as time went on the hope of pecuniary profit to be gained by
bartering away the prosecution of an Appeal offered a sharper
incentive for the initiation of the Appeal of Felony than did any
naked desire for vengeance. 28 It is interesting to note that sev-
eral recorded instances of royal pardon granted in an Appeal
of Felony on the ground of self-defense or misadventure clearly
indicate that the Crown was well aware of the function of the
Appeal as an instrument for compromise. The pardon was con-
ditioned upon the making of peace with the friends and kinfolk
of the victim. 24 Woodbine suggests that the tardy appearance
in history of the now familiar claim for damages might be ex-
plained by the fact that monetary satisfaction was frequently
secured through resort to a threat of prosecuting an Appeal.
21. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 476-83 (1895).
22. As late as 1401, Thirning. C.J., observed, "If a man kills or slays a
man by misfortune, he shall forfeit his goods, and he must obtain his charter
of pardon as an act of grace." Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B., 2 Hen. 4, f. 18, pl.
6; C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 166 (1949). Cf. Opinion
of Ride, C.J., in the Tithe case (1506), Y.B. Trin., 21 Hen. 7, f. 27, pl. 5; C.
Fifoot, op. cit. supra, at 197; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 98
(1909).
23. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799,
803 (1924).
24. Id. at 804.
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SUMvIARY OF LMIrrED ROLE OF FAULT UP TO THE
EMERGENCE OF TRESPASS
One value which hopefully we can gain from the foregoing
outline of the course of trial is an appreciation that crime and
tort had not yet fully separated by mid-thirteenth century and
that the notion of damages, in the sense of reparation, had not
fully emerged. Such limited significance as claims of misad-
venture and even self-defense had acquired at this time was
solely within the newly developing area of criminal punishment
by way of an Appeal of Felony; and even here they have barely
achieved the dignity of defenses as of right. Such, then, is the
stage that is set for the appearance of the action of Trepass.
THE ACTION OF TRESPASS
The precise source from which the action of Trespass de-
rived will perhaps never be settled beyond dispute. Pollock and
Maitland regard Trespass as an outgrowth of the Appeal of
Felony,2 5 and a similar attribution appears in Holmes' The Com-
mon Law.26 This explanation, however, fails to account for what
is definitely the most distinctive characteristic of Trepass-the
award of damages to the injured plaintiff.27 Furthermore, al-
though it is true that Trespass can be described as a semi-
criminal proceeding, yet the imposition of a fine or penalty was
not infrequent in other medieval civil actions as well.28
There is only a slightly better basis for the assertion, some-
times made, that Trepass had previously been recognized in the
local manorial courts and that it was imported thence into
the King's Court.29 The most plausible explanation, advanced by
Woodbine,80 is that Trespass emerged as a derivative of the
actions of novel Disseisin and possibly Replevin. This theory
offers an acceptable account of the award of monetary damages.
25. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 525 (1895).
26. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3, 4 (1963).
27. See note 20 supra.
28. C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 45, 46 (1949);
Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 34 YALE L.J. 343, 361 (1925).
29. This explanation was advanced by Bohlen, The Torts of Infants and
Insane Persons, 23 MIcH. L. REV. 9, 13 (1924), and F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN TORTS
543, 548 (1926). Woodbine points out that there was no record of the manorial
courts until the second half of the thirteenth century, at which time Tres-
pass was In frequent usage in the King's Courts. Woodbine, The Origins of
the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799, 800 (1924).




As a link between the actions the same writer points out the
violence characteristic of Trespass was fairly typical at the
time in ejectments from land as well as in cases of dispossession
of chattels.
Although Trespass did not emerge as a popular form of
action until the period 1250-1272,31 a few actions of Trespass
can be found in the rolls of the King's Bench for the reign of
John. When convicted of the trespass the defendant was fined
and subjected to imprisonment if the fine were not paid.82
The action of Trespass with its characteristic requirement
of force and arms (vi et armis) is of particular importance in
any effort to explore the role of fault in tort actions. The emer-
gence in Trespass of an intransigent requirement that there must
be an affirmative showing of a direct or immediate application
of force by defendant tended to eclipse completely all other
possible elements which otherwise might have influenced tres-
pass liability. Attention, focused upon the operative mechanics
that brought about the harm, was correspondingly distracted
from any indicia of blameworthiness or the absence thereof.
The phrase vi et armis appeared in every Trespass writ as of
course from the very beginning down to the abolition of the forms
of action in the nineteenth century. Strangely, the precise origin
of the term has never been made clear. Certainly the source of
vi et aTrmis is not in the Anglo-Saxon proceedings for bot and
wite, for we have already seen that archaic responsibility could
attach even where the causal connection between the defendant's
alleged participation and the injury or death was of the most
highly attenuated character imaginable.33 Similarly, liability for
mere failure to surrender as a deodand some offensive or harm-
inflicting object of which defendant happened to be the unhappy
possessor was something wholly different from the required
showing in Trespass that the defendant made a physical dem-
onstration of some kind.8 4 Nor does the appearance of vi et armis
in the Trespass action suggest any possible parenthood in the
Appeal of Felony. The term cum vi sua, which appears with
31. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 525 (1895).
32. This was also true in the assize of Novel Dissetsin. The criminal
sanction was no more than an amercement, which was not uncommon in
other civil actions. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 34
YAIZ L.J. 859 (1925).
33. See p. 3 supra.
34. Id.
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great frequency in Appeals, has an entirely different meaning.
It indicates "with his force (of helpers)," 5 thus suggesting
attack by a collective group, rather than by some single indi-
vidual.
Woodbine (whom this writer has come to regard as the
most persuasive authority on the early history of Trespass)
points out that several decades before the emergence of Tres-
pass proper there had appeared a number of variations of the
more venerable assize of Novel Disseisin. Notable among these
were the writs of quare vi et armis and quare intrusit, both of
which regularly stressed the force and arms that later character-
ized the writ of Trespass.8 6 Both these earlier actions dealt with
intrusions upon land, which almost invariably imported a use
of force. Like Trespass, the quare actions permitted a recovery
of damages whenever a restoration of possession could not fully
indemnify the complainant. The evidence is fairly persuasive,
therefore, that these were the true immediate forerunners of
Trespass, and that it is from them that the descriptive terms of
vi et armis, as well as contra pacem domini regis, were derived.
It is the general stereotyped writ of Trespass as of course
with which we are presently concerned, with its invariable
requirement of a showing of force or violence applied by the
defendant directly upon the person or the property of the
complainant. Facts that could fit within this pattern imported
of necessity a breach of the King's peace and thus supplied
automatically the element of public transgression or wrong. It is
not surprising, therefore, that no further showing of blame-
worthiness or fault on the part of the defendant was necessary
in order to warrant a recovery in Trespass.
Professor Street has observed that in the early litigated
cases the element of force was dramatic and conspicuous and
usually there was discoverable conduct partaking of a demon-
strably "violent" character as that term is popularly understood
today. 7 At the beginning, therefore, there was probably little
occasion for the judges to concern themselves with any refine-
ment of the fault element in Trespass. Wrongdoing was only
35. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 34 YALE L.J. 360
(1925).
36. Id. at 362-67.
37. 3 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 233 (1906).
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too obvious when the victim or his wife was beaten or his
chattels carried away or his land depastured.
However, as time went on the form of the Trepass writ
became crystallized, the element vi et armis changed in char-
acter. Force and arms was discoverable by the courts even
though the conduct charged against the defendant amounted
to little more than some mild innocuous physical motion toward
the person of the victim 8 or even a quiet passage across the
line that marked the boundary of his land.89 No longer need
there be a breaking of the fence or any theatric display of vio-
lence against the person. Vi et armis had assumed the artifi-
ciality of a mere technical device in pleading.
Along with "force and arms," the term, "breach of the
King's peace" (contra pacem) subsided into little more than
formalism. 40 It no longer indicated true wrongdoing on the part
of the defendant that would merit his punishment. Nevertheless,
the bare technical breach of peace itself continued to supply the
element of criminality and thus obviated any need for proof of
actual damages. Hence it could be said that every Trespass im-
ports a damage.4 '
We may be tempted to anticipate that at this stage judges
would feel an urge to initiate a search for personal misbehavior
of some kind to supply the missing element of wrongdoing that
was formerly implicit in "violence" and "breach of peace." But
such was not to be the case. Whenever the plaintiff could dem-
onstrate that in some way he was directly harmed by the de-
fendant's affirmative conduct he would have established his
prima facie right to recover in Trespass without more ado. The
observation on the inconsequence of fault in Trespass is sup-
ported by a substantial amount of dicta in the early decisions.
Writers have frequently pointed to statements such as the fol-
lowing comment by Rede, J. in the Tithe case (1506):
"Although the defendant's intent here was good, yet the
38. "Every trespass is in law done with force and arms." 2 C. ST. GER-
MAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 54. "If a log were put down In the most quiet way
and upon a man's foot, the action would be trespass." 1 J. CHrTY, PLEADING
124 (1809).
39. I.e., cutting a portion of a common vine on a wall without touching
the surface. Pickering v. Rudd, 1 Starkie 56 (1815).
40. The conclusion that the Trespass was "against the peace of our lord
the King" was not traversable. B. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING § 88 (3d
ed. 1923).
41. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs 29 (3d ed. 1964).
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intent is not to be construed, though in felony it shall be;
as where one shoots at the butts and kills a man, this is not
a felony, since he had no intent to kill him; and so of a tiler
on a house where against his knowledge a stone kills a man,
it is not felony. But where one shoots at the butts and
wounds a man, although it be against his will, yet he shall
be called a trespasser against his will.
42
Even earlier, in the Thorns case of 1466, Brian had observed,
"when any man does an act he is bound to do it in such a
manner that by his act no prejudice or damage is done to
others." 8 The court apparently agreed.
It is appropriate at this point to note that these early cases
with their dicta on fault were usually decisions concerned ex-
clusively with the scope and extent of some privilege which
the defendant had asserted. The Thorns case, for example, was
posited on the rather narrow question as to whether the defen-
dant was privileged to enter deliberately upon the plaintiff's
land in order to repossess himself of certain thorns that fell
onto the land while they were being severed by the defendant.
Similarly, the Tithe case, from which we have quoted, raised
only the issue as to whether the defendant could transport and
store grain of another person for the purpose of protecting it
as a tithe. The lengthy discussion, above, by Rede of the effect to
be given an absence of intent in a Trespass suit bore only tangen-
tially on the issue, for the defendant's conduct with reference to
the grain was clearly intentional.
This suggests the observation that a claimed absence of fault
or blameworthy conduct by a defendant can be brought into
focus within either of two entirely different contexts. In the
situations where a privilege is asserted, such as the Thorns case
or the Tithe case, the defendant seeks to persuade the court
that his conduct should be condoned, rather than blamed, be-
cause it was dedicated to some purpose that society would
approve. Absence of fault here is synonymous with presence
of an acceptable justification. Hence, a conflict of values is boldly
presented for resolution in these controversies.
42. Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, f. 27, pl. 5, reprinted in full in C. FIFOOT, IMSTORY AND
SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 197 (1949).
43. Y.B. 6 Ed. 4, f. 7, pl. 18, reprinted in C. FiFO0T, ISTORY AND SOURCES
OF THE COMMON LAW 195 (1949).
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On the other hand, such discussions of fault as that by
Rede in the Tithe case, above, were directed toward a quite dif-
ferent aspect of fault or blameworthiness, namely, the notion
of unintended or inadvertent harm. Here the defendant's claim
for escaping responsibility rests only upon his assertion that
he "didn't mean to do it," or he "couldn't help it." In this setting
there is no clear opposition of one value to another, as in the
privilege cases, and the person whose conduct was concededly
the source of the harm suffered by the victim may find that
his argument of innocence faces a cool reception in the courts.
INADVERTENT HARm-THE ESCAPE OF CATTLE AND FIRE
It is noteworthy that the first cases in which the court's
attention was focused upon harm inflicted through inadvertence
arose in connection with the escape of some dangerous agency
which the defendant had failed to control. Particularly signifi-
cant here were the two most obvious perils with which the
early community was faced-damage by fire and by domestic
animals at large.
The earliest case dealing with liability for the escape of
fire, Beaulieu v. Finglam (1401), 44 appeared to be concerned
primarily with the liability of a householder for fire damage
to his neighbor occasioned by the overturn of a candle through
the neglect of the defendant's servant or guest. 45 The court
observed that the householder was responsible although the
harm was occasioned by another person who was in occupancy
with defendant's permission. Although the court admitted that
the defendant might escape liability if a third person outside
the house had started the fire "against the will of the defen-
dant," nevertheless he remained responsible without reference
to fault where the harm was traceable to his own conduct or
the neglect of those whom he harbored within his dwelling.
Nearly three hundred years later (1697) an opinion hinted that
liability for escaping fire might be avoided by showing that the
44. Y.B. Hen. 4, f. 18, pl. 6, reprinted in C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES
OF THE COMMON LAw 166 (1949).
45. The word, neglect, which appears in several decisions of this period,
does not imply negligence in the sense of a want of reasonable care. This Is
made clear in another fire decision several centuries later. "Every man must
so use his own as not to injure another .... He must at his peril take care
that it does not through his neglect injure his neighbor." (Emphasis added.)
Turberville v. Stamp, KB [1967], 12 Mod. 152, 88 Eng. Rep. 1228.
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damage was occasioned by the intervention of a "violent" wind;4
but, absent some such outside intervention, unqualified liability
for the escape of fire persisted in England until the law was
modified by statute in 1770.47
Strict liability for damage to crops occasioned by the tres-
pass of domestic animals has been imposed since earliest times
and can fairly be regarded as a remnant of the notion of deodand
discussed earlier.48 The fact that the cattle escaped despite all
precautionary measures taken by the owner did not relieve
the latter of his responsibility.49
The earliest claims in which recovery was sought for the
damage done through the vicious character of dogs, bulls, and
other domestic animals were instituted by writs that alleged
that the defendant retained possession of the animal with knowl-
edge of its vicious character, indicating that such animals were
not kept at the peril of the owner until he had at least become
aware of their dangerous propensities.50 Knowledge of vicious-
ness, however, was all that was required. Thereafter it was
immaterial that the keeper did not intend that the animal should
annoy his neighbor, or even that he used every reasonable pre-
caution to restrain the creature.51
Apart from the situations involving the escape of fire and
animals, mentioned above, the problem of inadvertent injury
did not attract serious judicial attention until the seventeenth
century. The reason for this delayed appearance is fairly obvi-
ous. Until the advent of industrial machinery, dangerous sub-
stances, and congested traffic, there were comparatively few
ways in which one person could suffer an injury because of the
mere neglect or inadvertence of another. Land, whose cultiva-
tion and development was the principal source of wealth-
producing activity in the middle ages, was itself frequently the
victim of depredation (as by fire or cattle); but the tillage of
the soil and the production of goods by handcraft seldom posed
any serious threat that required affirmative vigilance by one
person for the safety of another.
46. Turberville v. Stamp, 1 Ld. Raym. 264, 88 Eng. Rep. 1228 (1697).
47. 6 Anne c. 31, § 6.
48. See p. 4 supra.
49. G. WmLIAMS, IAABiLrrY FOR ANIMALS, 185 (1939).
50. "Quare quendam canem ad nordendas oves conuetum apud o. scien-
ter retinuit." See discussion In G. WLLIAMS, IAABILTY FOR ANIMALS 278 (1939).
51. Id at 327.
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INADVERTENT INJURY THROUGH USE OF FIREARMS
With these thoughts in mind it is not surprising that the
first dramatic claims for bodily injury resulting from sheer in-
advertence arose out of the handling (or mishandling) of fire-
arms. Although rudimentary small arms such as the matchlock
and wheellock were known in the fifteenth century, small arms
did not come into frequent use until a hundred years later. The
problem of accidental shooting was launched in the much dis-
cussed seventeenth century decision, Weaver v. Ward.52 Weaver's
suit was framed strictly in Trespass, with the customary allega-
tion of vi et armis, direct injury, and without mention, pre-
sumably, of any wrongful intention or negligence by defendant
The latter did not deny the Trespass allegations, but set up
instead a plea by way of confession and avoidance in which
he relied upon the fact that while he and the plaintiff were
skirmishing with muskets in a military exercise the defendant
"casualiter et per infortumium et contra voluntatem suam"
in discharging his piece wounded the plaintiff. The latter
demurred to this plea and thus raised the question as to whether
any evidence admissible under an allegation such as the above,
conceding the Trespass, but denying all fault, could afford a
legal justification. The court, as might be expected, sustained
the demurrer. The opinion observed:
"... if men tilt or turney in the presence of the king,
or if two masters of defence playing their prizes kill one
another, that this shall be no felony; or if a lunatic kill a
man, or the like, because felony must be done animo
felonico: yet in trespass, which tends only to give damages
according to hurt or loss, it is not so; and therefore if a
lunatic hurt a man, he shall be answerable in tres-
itpass .... 
There is a striking similarity here to the previously quoted
statements by Rede in the Tithe case more than a hundred years
earlier.58
The portion of the opinion, however, that has excited the
interest of legal historians is the concluding sentence of the
paragraph above:
52. K.B. Div. [1617] Hob. 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284.
53. See p. 12 mpra.
[VOL. 31
RUMINATIONS ON LAW OF TORTS
"therefore no man shall be excused of a trespass.., except
it may be judged utterly without his fault....,p
Here, it seems, is found the first suggestion that a defendant
charged with Trespass may have a chance of being exonerated
if he can show affirmatively that he was blameless. This dictum
has been credited as the germ source of the notion which
eventually emerged fullblown two centuries later that the estab-
lishment of fault is an essential prerequisite to liability in tort. 4
It, therefore, deserves careful examination.
First, in the light of such an observation we are somewhat
at a loss to understand why the defendant Ward's plea was sum-
marily dismissed on demurrer and why he was not permitted
to present evidence in support of his claim that he was "utterly
without fault." What should he have added in order to bring
his case within the exception suggested by the dictum? We
are afforded some assistance in our effort to make a critical
appraisal of the dictum by the court's own commentary upon
the expression "utterly without fault." The same sentence in
the opinion continues by way of illustration as follows:
"... as if a man by force take my hand and strike you
or here the defendant had said that the plaintiff had run
across his piece when it was discharging, or had set forth
the case so as it had appeared to the court that it had been
inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negli-
gence to give occasion to the hurt."
The two specific instances suggested by the court above can
only be regarded fairly as illustrations of an absence of any
force employed by the defendant-as where his hand was the
mere passive instrument of harm, or where, as in the second
instance, it is doubtful that the force of the projectile should be
regarded as the immediate or direct cause of the wounding,
it being suggested that the victim himself ran into the path
of the bullet. These are both instances where arguably no
Trespass has been committed. Such matters would not expectably
be raised by way of justification or excuse, but rather by way
of a plea of "not guilty."' 5 Certainly if the term, "utterly with-
54. See, e.g., Bohlen, The Torts of Infants and Insane Personts, 23 MICH.
L. Rav. 9, 13 (1924) and F. BOHLEN, STUDiES IN TORTS 549 (1926).
55. A demurrer to a plea of justification was sustained for this precise
reason in Gibbons v. Pepper, K.B. 1695, 1 Ld. Raym. 38.
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out fault," was intended to suggest only that in the absence of
a direct use of force the defendant is not properly chargeable
with Trespass, it adds nothing novel to the law as it had pre-
viously existed.
The quotation above, however, continues by indicating that
the defendant could exonerate himself from liability in Trespass
if he "had set forth the case so as it had appeared that . . . the
defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to
the hurt." (Emphasis added.) We may be tempted to indulge
in the surmise that the court here is stating that proof of the
use of reasonable care by the defendant will be sufficient reason
to show that he was "utterly without fault" and to thus relieve
him of responsibility. This, however, is too easy a conclusion.
The word, negligence (or neglect), had been used previously
to indicate a failure to act as distinguished from affirmative
misconduct. It was a familiar term in the fire cases and had
been used to indicate that liability for fire was absolute, (i.e.,
"he must at his peril (italics supplied) take care that it does
not, through his neglect, injure his neighbor."50 It is conceded
everywhere that negligence, meaning a failure to use the care
of a reasonable prudent man, is a much later development.
This mythical creature did not make its appearance in English
tort law until the nineteenth century was well under way.57
Despite these words of caution regarding the famous dictum
in Weaver v. Ward, the language still leaves us with an impres-
sion that under some imaginable circumstance a showing of
complete blamelessness might serve to exonerate the hapless
gunhandler who inadvertently injured another. Certainly this
interpretation has been advanced by many writers,8 and it
was finally adopted by the Queen's Bench in a decision in
1890.59 But in significant contrast is the derogatory fact that for
nearly three hundred years after the case was decided we do
56. Turberville v. Stamp, 3 Ld. Raym. 264, 88 Eng. Rep. 1228 (1697). See
interesting commentary in T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAw 469 (5th ed. 1956); see also J. CHARLESWORTH, LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS
THINGS ch. IV (1922).
57. The first effort to establish a standard of care in terms of the "reason-
able man" was in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 467, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(1837). The term was borrowed from the earlier bailment case, Coggs v.
Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1703), where an obligation to use reasonable care
was regarded as an implied term in a contract of bailment.
58. Bohlen, The Torts of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV.
9 (1924); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 83 (1963).
59. Stanley v. Powell, 1 Q.B. 86 (1891).
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not find a single English decision in which a defendant charged
with accidental shooting managed to escape liability through
the loophole of Weaver v. Ward-"utterly without his fault,"
although there are several instances of record where the attempt
was made unsuccessfully.' ° Even after mid-nineteenth century,
by which time proof of defendant's negligence or intention was
coming to be generally recognized as an essential requirement
for a recovery, there remained a strong tendency in the acci-
dental shooting cases to refuse to impose upon the plaintiff
the necessity of establishing fault and instead to saddle the
defendant with the burden of exonerating himself by showing
"that the discharge was entirely without his fault and that it
had happened by accident unavoidable by him."' This anoma-
lous treatment of the accidental shooting situations was
recognized by the Queen's Bench in England as late as 1890 in
Stanley v. Powell.62
EMERGENCE OF THE ACTION OF TRESPASS ON THE CASE
Returning to the earlier discussion of Trespass it will be
recalled that the fundamental element of that action consists
of an application of force by the defendant directly to the person
or the possession of the plaintiff. Proof of force and directness
justified recovery in trespass without any further showing-
such as of fault or blameworthiness. But equally important is
the converse of this proposition. If there was no demonstrable
use of force by the defendant, or if such force as was used
operated only indirectly to produce harm, the suit in Trespass
was certain to fail. It is possible that for a short early period
during the development of tort law the unfortunate suitor
who could not fit his complaint within the confines of the
Trespass writ found himself without recourse available in the
King's Court. But such denials could not have persisted very
long. It will be recalled that there is no record of Trespass
60. Dickenson v. Watson, 34 Car. 2, 84 Eng. Rep. 1218 (1682); Underwood
v. Hewson, 1 Strange 596, 93 Eng. Rep. 722 (1724); Dixon v. Bell, 5 Mau. &
Sel. 198, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (1816)(gun was discharged even though defen-
dant had removed the priming; liability imposed). Cf. Anonymous, Cro. Eliz.
10, A.D. 1582 (householder shot at a fowl from the door of his house and
set the house afire).
Numerous American decisions of the nineteenth century are to the same
effect as above. They are listed, with an Interesting discussion, in Inbau,
Firearms and Legal Doctrine, 7 TUL. L. Rlv. 528, 548 (1923).
61. The language here is taken from Hawksley v. Peace, 38 R.I. 544,
96 A. 856 (1916).
62. 1 Q.B. 86 (1891).
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prior to the middle of the thirteenth century. By about the same
time, in 1285, there was adopted by the King's Council the
Statute of Westminster 1163 providing in substance that when-
ever in one case a writ was found and in like cases falling
under like law no such writ was discoverable, Chancery was
authorized, subject to certain precautions, to issue a new writ
appropriate to the particular needs of the case before the court.
Hence there came into being a companion form of action known
as the action of Trespass on the Case. This form was available
whenever the complaint showed a complete absence of force
or an injury that was only indirectly inflicted. The new action
had become familiar by the first half of the fourteenth century.64
Much historical scholarship has been devoted to the origin
and development of the new action, and the wavering line that
separates the action of Trespass from the action on the Case
has been a frequent source of confusion for judges and writers.6 5
Fortunately for our present purpose we need take special note
of ' only two characteristics of the action on the Case that dis-
tinguish it from Trespass. First, it has been said that in an
action on the Case the complainant must show injury and
damage, 0 whereas we have observed that in Trespass, damage
is implied from the trespassory invasion itself.67 This difference
is to be expected, since the defendant in Trespass on the Case
was most frequently charged only with an omission to act
(non-feasance). It follows that the plaintiff's suit would have
little purpose unless he could in some way demonstrate a tie-in
between some harm suffered by him and the omission charged
against the defendant. Thus the establishment of a "resulting
damage" as a requirement was to be expected.
Second, we are particularly interested in the observation
frequently made that proof of wrongdoing or fault has been
an essential prerequisite to recovery in Trespass on the Case
from the very beginning of that action. It is submitted that this
observation proves entirely too much. It is certainly true that
some act or omission amounting to what we would now term
63. C. 24.
64. See the Table of Dates of the earliest writs in A. KIRALFY, THE ACTION
ON THE CASI 17 (1951).
65. Although the textual treatments of the distinction are numerous, the
reader is referred particularly to 3 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABLITY
252-67 (1906).
66. A. IRALFY, THE ACTION ON THE CASH 12 (1951).
67. See p. 11 supra.
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a breach of duty by the defendant must be shown. This is con-
sistent with the requirement that there be proof of damage as
mentioned above. Where, as in claims asserted in actions on
the Case, there can be no showing that defendant actively moved
in upon the plaintiff, it follows that the latter must in some
way tie his damage to something that the defendant did not do
that he should have done. Obviously, the defendant must have
failed with reference to the performance of some legal
expectation, and if this is all that is to be implied from the
requirement of wrongdoing, the only objection to the use of the
term is that it is highly confusing.
Kiralfy points out that in many early actions on the Case
the conduct complained of was assumed to be already wrongful.
He mentions contempt of court or failure to execute judicial
process-acts which are inconsistent with any system of law.
Such positive duties are in no way dependent upon any personal
misbehavior by defendant, yet a breach of them resulting in
damage will give rise to a successful claim in Trespass on the
Case.
The most common types of legal expectation with which all
persons were obliged to conform in medieval society were those
imposed by custom. These customs were numerous, and they
were of several varieties. Sometimes they were imposed locally,
such as the duty to repair certain walls or to scour ditches or
ponds. 9 It is noteworthy that liability for the spread of fire
was imposed through an action on the Case based upon breach
of the "custom of the realm," which amounted to an obligation
on every man "to keep his fire safe and secure lest through
his fire any damage result in any way to his neighbors." 7 Here
the element of "wrong" means no more than a default in per-
formance of the unqualified duty to keep safely. The defendant
is sued, not because he has been a careless wrongdoer, but
because where he should have followed the exacting require-
ments of the custom, he did not do so.7 1
Mention has already been made of unqualified liability for
the trespasses of cattle and for injuries inflicted by domestic
68. A. KIRALFY, THE AcTIoN ON THE CASE 9 (1951).
69. Anonymous, Y.B., 45 Edw. 3, f. 17, pl. 6 (1372).
70. Y.B. 2 Hen. IV f. 18, pl. 6 (1401). See A. KmIRALFY, THE ACTION ON THE
CASE 99 (1951).
71. A. KnRALy, THE ACTION ON THE CASE 154 (1951).
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animals known to be vicious. The claim for damages done by
cattle trespass was traditionally asserted in a suit for Tres-
pass, although the defendant's only default in many of these
cases was a failure to confine the animal; and logically nuisance
might have been a more appropriate action.7 2 In contrast, claims
for the harms of animals known to be vicious were asserted
traditionally in an action on the Case based on the custom of
the realm.7 8 Nevertheless, liability was absolute in both instances
irrespective of whatever form of action was deemed appropriate.
LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS, CARRIERS AND OTHER
PERSONS ENGAGED IN COMMON CALLINGS
A common use of Trespass on the Case as a means of exact-
ing recovery for breach of some legal duty grounded on custom
is found in suits brought in Case against persons who defaulted
in the discharge of some customary duty incident to a public
calling in which they were engaged. In his treatment on carrier's
liability Beale points out, "From the earliest times certain
tradesmen and artificers were treated in an exceptional way,
on the ground that they were engaged in a 'common' or public
occupation; and for a similar reason public officials were sub-
jected to the same exceptional treatment.'7 4 Included were inn-
keepers, victuallers, taverners, smiths, farriers, tailors, carriers,
ferrymen, sheriffs, and gaolors. Although Beale expressed doubt
as to whether unqualified liability existed with respect to all
loss and under all circumstances that could be causally attri-
buted to the acts or omissions of persons engaged in common
callings,7 5 yet all the cases cited by him indicate that what might
appropriately be called a warrantor's liability was almost uni-
versally imposed whenever the defendant held himself out in
a common calling and the loss could be attributed to some act
or omission within the scope thereof.76 Denials of liability re-
72. See G. WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS 188 (1939).
73. Id. at 278; A. KIRALFY, THE ACTION ON THE CASE 100 (1951).
74. Beale, The History of the Carrier's Liability, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 154 (1909).
75. Id. at 156.
76. The Instances mentioned by Beale where the defendant engaged in a
common calling was nevertheless exonerated from liability (Beale, The His-
tory of the Carrier's Liability, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 157 (1909)) are situations where the injury could fairly be regarded
as outside the scope of the defendant's undertaking. He refers to the jailer
who was liable at his peril for a breaking of the jail but not against fire, and
the carrier who was responsible for theft on the road, but not against theft
at an inn. All these relate, of course, to the scope of the defendant's under-
taking rather than to the quality of his performance.
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lated invariably to harms that were outside the scope of his
undertaking.
The standard common law form of the suit (which was
invariably in Trespass on the Case) against an innkeeper for a
loss of goods recites a general law and custom "that common
innkeepers must keep all guests staying with him immune from
loss of their goods, lest by default of their custody any harm
should come to them. '77 The exercise of reasonable care by the
innkeeper afforded no justification.
Holmes suggests that the extraordinary liability of a carrier
of goods (which still obtains today, except as modified by statute
of administrative regulation) is a residuary form of the absolute
liability that was at one time imposed upon all bailees.78 But
whatever the source, the unqualified character of the liability
was clear. "If a man delivers goods to a common carrier to
carry, and the carrier is robbed of them, still he shall be charged
with them, because he had hire for them, and so implicitly took
upon him the safe delivery of the goods; and therefore he shall
answer for the value of them if he be robbed.
'79
Any person engaged in a common calling was bound to
carry on his trade or occupation "rightly and truly as he ought. '8 0
By undertaking the special duty he warranted his special prep-
aration for it. It is difficult in these, cases to assign a proper role
for any claimed absence of blame that might be asserted by the
defendant. Certainly it is difficult to find any case where the
person engaged in a common calling successfully escaped lia-
bility for harm inflicted by establishing that he used a measure
of care appropriate to the calling in which he was engaged.
Usually the fact that harm was inflicted on plaintiff or his prop-
erty during the exercise by defendant of his public calling re-
sulted in liability. A good illustration is afforded by the case
against a sheriff for non-return of a writ to court. He was held
liable notwithstanding his plea that he gave the writ to the
coroner, who was robbed. The court replied simply, "The duty
to guard was yours."8'
77. A. KIRALFY, THE ACTioN ON THE CASE 151 (1951).
78. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, Lect. 5 (1963).
79. Woodlift's case, as reported in 1 ROLLE'S ABRIDGMENT 2.
80. F.N. B. 94 d.
81. 41 Ass. 254, pl. 12 (1366).
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ACTION OF TRESPASS ON THE CASE-SUMMARY
The emergence of the action of Trespass on the Case and
the increasingly frequent use to which this action was placed
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries made possible success-
ful suits based upon neglect to prevent harm. Hence recovery
was no longer limited to those situations where the defendani
employed force directly against the plaintiff or his possession.
Courts thus became familiar with the language of duty, and the
term "neglect" made its appearance in the opinions. But the
neglected duty was in most instances one which existed inde-
pendent of the action on the Case and which had little or noth-
ing to do with "fault" as we envisage that term today.82 It is
more appropriately regarded as an obligation to follow at peril
some recognized practice or custom. Indeed, certain areas where
liability has remained virtually absolute in England even today
are areas in which the action was traditionally Trespass on the
Case. Included here are liability for fire, liability based upon
the harboring of vicious animals, and the liabilities to which
carriers and innkeepers are subject. The close association be-
tween the action of Trespass on the Case and the modern con-
ception of negligence was not to appear until after 1800, nearly
three hundred years later.
A FUNCTIONAL VIEWPOINT ON THE LATE EMERGENCE OF
NEGLIGENCE
The imposition of virtual no-fault liability in both Trespass
and Trepass on the Case in England continuously throughout
the middle ages and, in fact, up until the nineteenth century,
should not be attributed to some lack of moral sensitivity on
the part of English judges. The then current attitude toward
fault, or its absence, probably reflected the ethical social and
economic needs of the times at least as faithfully as presently
prevalent ideas of negligence reflect those of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
It is important to bear in mind that in an earlier society
most harms were inflicted intentionally. When such is the sit-
uation, conflicts in social and economic values are brought into
focus and resolved through determinations as to when and to
82. Winfield & Goodhart point out that an action on the case for negli-
gence itself does not appear clearly until COMYN'S DIGEST (1762). Winfield &
Goodhart, Trerpa8 d Negligence, 49 L.Q. Rsv. 359, 364 (1933).
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what extent a privilege to assault, to batter, or to trespass
should be recognized. The resolution of conflicts here followed
the pattern that would be expected in a highly individual so-
ciety in which the chief source of wealth was the land, which
was regarded as sacrosanct.
With respect to inadvertent injuries, we may well remem-
ber, first, that these were infrequent and, second, that those
accidental injuries which the early courts were obliged to face
fell into a few stereotypes, involving specific dangers with which
the public was entirely familiar-harms which it greatly feared
and which it was eager to suppress. We have mentioned the
strict liability for fire. This was the greatest hazard of the
medieval towns: a blaze fanned by wind could quickly wipe
out a block of wooden houses, yet equipment to fight it was
cumbersome and slow.83 Regulations concerning firefighting and
the suppression of fire were numerous,8 4 and strict liability im-
posed against those who were the custodians of flame was to be
expected.
The persistence of absolute liability for the trespasses of
domestic animals is more difficult to justify in terms of the social
and economic needs of the time, for England's economy during
the middle ages was dependent equally upon the growing of
crops and the pasturage of animals (particularly sheep). Hence
some sort of reconciliation of conflicting needs through resort
to the phrases of negligence would have been expected in the
opinions dealing with this subject. Perhaps the traditional stone
fencing disposed in orderly array throughout the English coun-
tryside afforded a setting where effective restraint by the owners
of cattle and horses imposed no serious hardship upon them.
But strict liability here must be regarded chiefly as a vestige of
primeval habits that traditionally dominated popular thinking
about harm done by animals. At the beginning, vengeance was
wreaked upon the offending beast itself, and the unfortunate
creature was promptly killed by the victim of its trespasses.85
The owner's obligation to surrender it over was absolute at first.
There probably developed a practice of compromise whereby
the life of the offending animal could be purchased by the owner
83. The Great Fire of London of 1212 resulted in death by burning or by
drowning in the Thames of a good tenth of the population of the City. See
F. KAY, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AucE PERRERS 101 (1966).
84. P. KENDALL, THE YORKIST AGE 83 (1962).
85. G. WMLAMS, IAAMLIY FOR ANIMALs 9 (1939).
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through the payment of money.86 This in turn resulted in the
emergence of a recognized tariff pursuant to which the animal
could be reclaimed as of right. Added to this should be noted
the tendency of early people to attribute wrongdoing to the beast
which had consciously invaded the land and the primitive in-
clination to readily identify the animal with its owner so that
its trespass became his trespass.
The strict liability that was imposed upon the common car-
rier was something entirely to be expected during the earlier
period with which we are here concerned. Common carriers
began to make their appearance about 1400, but they did not
become an institution until the middle of the century when
there were scheduled journeys between London and other cities
as far away as York. Before that time only the wealthiest gentry
could afford to keep men in their service to carry their letters
or transport their goods to a distance. The average medieval
village was almost completely cut off from the rest of the world.
Of travel in the modern esthetic sense there was little in the
English middle ages.87 With villages remote from each other
and connected by only the most rudimentary paths, the threat
of the highwayman was real and ever present.8  The world out-
side one's own native village appeared strange and menacing,
and the safety of one's person and goods could not lightly be
entrusted to the professional carrier, who may himself be a
stranger to the community and who certainly could easily con-
nive with robbers and then disclaim any responsibility for which
he could be blamed. Stratagems by early shippers to protect
themselves against imposition by the carriers have become leg-
endary,8 9 and strict responsibility for the safety of both passen-
ger and goods would seem to be the natural demand of the
public. The same may be said of the innkeeper who could proffer
the only available refuge for the traveler in a strange country-
side infested with brigands and thieves, and who might too
frequently be a scoundrel himself.
As indicated in the preceding pages, strict liability is the
public response that is to be expected whenever the society of
a given time and place must deal with specific perils which it
has come to recognize as serious threats to its welfare. This was
86. Id. at 12.
87. G. COULTON, MEDIEVAL PANORAMA 317 (1938).
88. P. KENDALL, THE YORKIST AGE 238 (1962).
89. Id. at 242.
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true of the hazards of fire, the depredations of animals and the
risks of misconduct by carriers, innkeepers and others engaged
in public callings. And, despite the vague dictum in Weaver v.
Ward,90 strict liability has in practice been the public's answer
to mishaps attributable to the use of firearms.
The conception of negligence or liability upon a flexible
standard of care is not likely to come into being until society
has reached a stage where diverse economic and social needs
have emerged and are in lively competition with each other. The
formation of a mature set of values of this kind must await the
appearance of certain clearly definable human activities in each
of which an appreciable number of human beings are engaged.
Only as society becomes clustered into meaningful activity
groups whose respective needs come into conflict can a situation
arise in which a court is faced with a dilemma that obliges it
to venture the opinion that the claims of those who are engaged
in one activity are to be weighed against the claims of others
engaged in another activity,9' and one activity given preference
over the other.
THE EmERGING GROUP INTEREST IN TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION
The most significant group interest of the kind suggested
above and the one which later was most profoundly to influence
the entire basis of tort law was the public need for travel and
transportation. Early society was slow to press its claims in this
direction. The feudal system restricted the bulk of the people to
the small medieval villages in which they were born and from
which they seldom strayed during the course of an entire life-
time. Most roads made only for the nearest village, without any
more distant horizon in thought. "The average road was a coun-
try lane running through deep woods and across sweeps of moor
and marsh, unsign-posted, generating forks and branching tracks
to puzzle the traveler, sometimes ending abruptly at a ford that
had disappeared under high water.
'92
As the middle ages passed it is doubtful that the state of the
roads improved appreciably. In fact, one may surmise that the
condition even deteriorated as heavy carts and carriages ap-
90. Discussed at p. 16 aupra.
91. Malone, Ruminations on Group Interest and the Law of Torts, 13
RUTonRS L. REV. 565, 567 (1959).
92. P. KzNDAIL, THE, YORKIsT AoB 238 (1962).
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peared and scored the crude roadways with deep ruts. Up
through the seventeenth century the repair of the roads was
the responsibility of the local manor, burrough, or hundred
which frequently failed its obligation. Horse-drawn traffic pro-
ceeding along such ways as these obviously could generate little
speed or dangerous highway congestion. The perils of travel lay
with the highwayman and brigand and not with upset or col-
lision of vehicles. Within the larger towns the streets were so
narrow, so crudely paved, and so ill-adapted to hasty travel
that street accidents as we now know them were comparatively
rare occurrences.
However, a few cases can be found in the yearbooks as early
as the middle of the fourteenth century dealing with injuries
through collision or rundown in traffic. Trespass was uniformly
the appropriate action. It is particularly noteworthy that terms
such as driving "negligently" or "heedlessly and carelessly"
appear even in the early proceedings. Yet there is nothing to
indicate that any finding of fault was made or even suggested.98
The same appears in several seventeenth century decisions
where both the common allegations of force and arms and a
claim of "careless handling" can be found. 4
Beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century there
occurred several developments that were to facilitate traffic and
transportation substantially in the decades to come and would
invite a major readjustment within the law of torts. Foremost
was the formulation of a scientific method for road construction.
A Scotsman, John Lewis McAdam, proposed the laying of a
roadbed of crushed rock with a surfacing of finely broken
gravel. The process was relatively simple and inexpensive and
it was promptly put into use. This in turn led to the emergence
of the turnpike system and made possible the levying of tolls
upon traffic as a much needed supplement to the older local
maintenance system. 5 As roads improved so did the character
of the vehicles that were to travel upon them. There came into
being the stagecoach, the gig, the tallyho and other lighter and
faster devices. Under this increased demand road construction
was further stimulated and a cycling of progress was under way.
93. These early cases are cited and discussed in A. KhaLrY, THE ACTION
ON THE CASE 102 (1951).
94. Id.
95. 22 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BmTANNicA Transport 412 (1957).
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Finally in 1835 a general overhauling of all the English highway
laws was undertaken.9
The first upset or collision decisions near the turn of the
eighteenth century and into the nineteenth adopted the tradi-
tional position that whenever there is a direct application of
force, as where the horse or carriage of the defendant is driven
against the plaintiff on the highway, Trespass, and not Trespass
on the Case, is the only proper remedy.' However, even in these
first cases it is curious to note an urging by counsel of a position
-later to prevail-that where it appears the injury was in-
flicted through negligence only, Trespass on the Case is a proper
remedy; while Trespass itself is the only available form of action
for an intentional or willful wrong. These arguments were not
countenanced by the courts at first.
The first intimation that an action of Trespass on the Case
could be appropriately instituted in a collision situation came
in 1799 when, in a suit arising from a collision of two boats that
resulted from the alleged "incautious, careless, and negligent"
management and steering of the defendant's vessel, the court
sustained the use of Trespass on the Case. 8 It is not clear, how-
ever, from the three reported opinions in this decision that the
court intended to sanction the use of Case whenever the claim
is based upon merely negligent wrong. The opinion of Lord
Kenyon stressed the fact that the defendants could not be re-
garded as having done any act at all, since the impelling forces
were the wind and the waves. Opinions of the other two Jus-
tices, Grose and Lawrence, however, seem to express satisfaction
with the use of Trespass as the exclusive writ for intentional
wrongs and the availability of Trespass on the Case as a con-
current remedy whenever negligence appears to have been the
cause.
The first decision affirming unequivocally the availability
of a suit in Trespass on the Case when harm was directly in-
flicted through negligence was Rogers v. Imbledon in 1806.21 In
the opinion Sir James Mansfield denied that the decision was
96. Laws V & VI, William IV, c. 50. See the excellent discussion in
L. GREmN, TRAFFIC VIcTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSUTANCm 11-17 (1958).
97. Hopper v. Reeve, 7 Taunt. 699, 129 Eng. Rep. 278 (1817); Leame v.
Bray, 3 East. 593, 102 Eng. Rep. 724 (1803); Savignac v. Roome, 6 T.R. 125,
101 Eng. Rep. 470 (1794); Day v. Edwards, 5 T.R. 648, 101 Eng. Rep. 361 (1794).
98. Ogle v. Barnes, 8 T.R. 188, 101 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1799).
99. 2 B. & P. (n.r.) 117, 127 Eng. Rep. 5687.
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opposed to the earlier line of authority, but he suggested that
in a "proper case" these authorities should be reconsidered.
Nineteen years later the same position was reaffirmed in More-
ton v. Hardern.'00 This latter decision suggested, without de-
ciding, that where the damage was directly inflicted through
negligence (as opposed to wilfulness or intention) the plaintiff
may choose Trespass or Case at his option and this observation
was accepted as clearly the rule in 1833 in Williams v. Holland.'0 '
The result was interesting: if the plaintiff were to elect to stress
the direct application of force and to cast his claim as one in
Trespass, he would avoid, as we have seen, the necessity of
either alleging or proving any negligence or intent on the part
of the defendant. The most that could be said under such cir-
cumstances is that the defendant might affirmatively set up the
plea of inevitable accident. 10 2 If, on the other hand, the plaintiff
were to elect to treat the accident only as a consequence of
defendant's negligence and accordingly to proceed in Trespass on
the Case, he would be obliged to show affirmatively a duty of
care owed by defendant and a breach of that duty, resulting in
damage. The plaintiff, by so choosing his remedy, would relieve
the defendant of the burden of alleging and establishing any
plea of inevitable accident.
It is therefore puzzling as to why a victim who could show
a direct application of force and proceed in Trespass would ever
choose to undertake needlessly the burden of attempting to
establish negligence. Yet such a choice of Trespass on the Case
appears to have been made with great frequency in the early
cases; and this was true even when, as at first, the attempt
brought about a dismissal of the claim. Several reasons for the
preference of Case have been suggested. First, the choice of
Case could prove to be less costly to the pleader in terms of
money. "[I]f in an action of trespass the plaintiff recover less
than 40s, he is entitled to no more costs than damages; whereas
a verdict of nominal damages only in an action on the case
carries all the costs."'10 3 Winfield and Goodhart have suggested
additionally that a choice of Trespass on the Case offered a
strategic advantage to the pleader who may have had reason to
100. 4 B. & C. 223, 107 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1825).
101. 10 Bing. 112.
102. This was affirmed as late as 1842. Hall v. Fearnley, 2 Q.B. 919, 114
Eng. Rep. 761 (1842).
103. Lord Kenyon, 3. in Savignac v. Roome, 6 T.R. 129, 130, 101 Eng. Rep.
470, 472 (1794).
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anticipate difficulty in establishing that the injury was inflicted
directly. If the pleader could assume safely that the defendant's
conduct was not willful, Case would support recovery for either
a direct or indirect injury.10 4 This writer has some doubt as to
whether any such pleading advantage as that suggested would
account for the choice of Trespass on the Case in the earlier
highway controversies. It is to be remembered that these were
cases of collision or running down. Hence the directness of the
infliction of injury was nearly always obvious. The writer has
found only one decision in this early period in which the plaintiff
might reasonably have feared that the injury was inflicted only
indirectly and hence that Case would be the appropriate form.
This was Hopper v. Reeve (1817).10 5 In that case the plaintiff
was seated in a vehicle that belonged to a third person and
which was struck by the defendant's horse. The blow to the
vehicle resulted in bodily injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant
urged that the bodily injury was indirect. The court held, how-
ever, that Trespass, not Trespass on the Case, was the proper
action. Indeed, the procedural advantage would seem to dictate
a choice of Trespass because under this action it would be im-
material whether the defendant's conduct were intentional, neg-
ligent, or neither.
THE ABOLITION OF THE DISTINcTION BETWEEN TRESPASS AND CASE
Up to this point the effect to be given an absence of negli-
gence has become wholly intervolved with the procedural ques-
tion as to what form of action is appropriate and available. Now
we must note that the English Judicature Acts, 1873-1875, wholly
abolished the forms of action. A suit is no longer to be desig-
nated as Trespass or as Trespass on the Case. Once this step
had been taken, what is to become of the former distinction
between direct and indirect injury, which had once formed the
boundary between Trespass and Case? If this distinction is to
persist on the ground that it is substantive, and not merely
procedural, are we to conclude that where the injury is direct
the plaintiff may still cast upon the defendant the burden of
undertaking to show that he was not to blame or that he was
"utterly without fault," as was formerly true? Or, conversely,
with the actions abolished, are we to conclude that where the
104. Winfield & Goodhart, Trespass and Negligence, 49 L.Q. REv. 359, 365
(1933).
105. 7 Taunt. 699, 129 Eng. Rep. 278 (1817).
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injury is only indirect or consequential the plaintiff must still
undertake to establish that the defendant breached his duty
of care?
These questions came very near to finding their answer
in Holmes v. Mather,0 6 a running down case that was decided
immediately after the adoption of the first Judicature Act. The
first part of the opinion of Bramwell, B. is couched in broad
language indicating that proof of fault is always essential in a
personal injury claim:
"For the convenience of mankind in carrying on the
affairs of life, people as they go along roads must expect,
or put up with such mischief as reasonable care on the part
of others cannot avoid."
The clear implication here is that the plaintiff must take
upon his own shoulders the risk of injury except where he can
affirmatively establish fault or negligence. Unfortunately, the
acceptance of any such conclusion is sorely embarrassed by
other findings in the same opinion.
The declaration in Holmes v. Mather was precautiously
framed in two counts: The first count placed the emphasis on
the negligent handling of the horses by the defendant which
resulted in his horse's running into plaintiff; while the second
count stressed the force and violence of the driving and the
direct character of the injury without mention of fault. When
the case went to trial the jury found that there was no negli-
gence. Thus the way was open for the court to announce spe-
cifically the effect to be given such a finding. But despite the
brave language quoted above, the court devoted most of the
opinion to an elaboration of the facts leading up to the accident,
and it concluded that the injury was not inflicted through any
direct application of force by plaintiff and hence the controversy
would not have presented facts appropriate to a suit in Trespass
had it arisen prior to the Judicature Acts. Indeed, the situation
as described by the court resolved itself into a run-away horse
picture of the kind that courts had excluded from the realm of
a Trespass action a hundred and fifty years earlier.'07
Despite this detraction, the statement quoted above afforded
106. Exchequer, 1875; L.R. 10 Ex. 261 (1875).
107. Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. Raym. 38, 91 Eng. Rep. 922 (1695).
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the foretaste of an attitude toward the fault requirement that
was to dominate later decisions. For this reason alone it deserves
special attention. First, it is particularly noteworthy that Bram-
well's attention was focused on the problem of injuries occurring
on the public roads, and his statements could fairly be inter-
preted as being relevant only to travel accidents. In this connec-
tion we may note that Holmes v. Mather was a culmination of
perhaps a dozen decisions related to mishaps on the highways
over a past period of nearly a hundred years. As the course of
traffic litigation moved further into the nineteenth century the
courts showed themselves to be increasingly receptive to a duty
of care approach evidenced by an expanded employment of
Trespass on the Case. By the same token they betrayed an aver-
sion to the older mechanical solution afforded by the action of
Trespass. There was no indication of a similar approach in tort
litigation outside the field of traffic accidents.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the liberality
toward the defendant's predicament in the traffic cases was an
outgrowth of the practical dilemma for litigation that was shap-
ing up as the roads of nineteenth century England were grad-
ually improved. Courts were faced with the fact that there was
a pressing interest in the full utilization of the highways, and
that decisions mechanically rendered in favor of victims under
the Trespass theory would have a serious adverse effect on
highway users.0 8 An impressive group interest in travel had
emerged and courts were impelled to take it into account. Hence
the plaintiff, if he were to recover, must make a presentation
with greater appeal than a mere showing that his injury was
"directly" inflicted. It became apparent that under the strict
Trespass action, no traveler could afford to risk his fortune by
making use of the highways. Thus the idea of negligence emerged
as an inviting compromise in these cases: let the driver do all
that he can to avoid a mishap, and if an accident nevertheless
occurs, he will not be held responsible. In this way each traveler
received some-but not complete-protection, and all were af-
forded an opportunity to avoid liability by so conducting them-
108. A good illustration of the absurdity of the Trespass approach in
traffic is afforded by Pearcy v. Walter, 6 Carr. & P. 232, 172 Eng. Rep. 1220
(1834) where a suit in Trespass was brought for driving a gig against the
horse of plaintiff and wounding it, In consequence of which it died. The
question of liability was made to depend upon whether defendant drove the




selves as to reduce the accident risk to a minimum. In the early
nineteenth century cases, then, the courts faced up to the fact
that they were called upon to do more than consider the claims
of isolated individuals. The task of the law was to adjust conflicts
between members of a group of highway users, and the interests
of all highway users-the interests of the group itself-were at.
stake.
We can readily gain the impression that Bramwell did not
intend that his observations on the necessity of showing negli-
gence in Holmes v. Mather should apply generally throughout
torts law. The statement quoted earlier can fairly be interpreted
as a strong suggestion that members of the public by going
voluntarily upon the highways must be deemed to have taken
upon themselves the risk that they might be injured by the
non-negligent conduct of others. In other words, venturing upon
the roads and streets involves a surrender at such places of the
traditional rights of citizens to recover for directly inflicted in-
jury without establishing fault. When viewed in this light the
highway injury picture can appropriately be regarded as an
exception to a general prevailing principle of absolute liability.
INJURIES TO NEIGHBORING LAND OWNERS-FLETCHER V. RYLANDS
This same version of the highway accident as an anomalous
situation to be dealt with separately had been propounded at
mid-century in the much-discussed litigation of Fletcher v. Ry-
lands. 1 9 This famous case deals, as readers know, with the fault
requirement as it affects controversies between adjoining land-
owners. Its importance lies largely in the fact that it is here for
the first time that we find a series of considered judicial elabora-
tions upon the theme of fault in English tort law.
The facts of Fletcher v. Rylands are familiar and need be
only outlined here. The plaintiff and defendant owned neighbor-
ing (although not adjacent) tracts of land in a rural area. The
plaintiff's land was operated as a mine, and it was connected
with the defendant's tract by a network of ancient subterranean
mine workings which had been abandoned and whose presence
was entirely unknown to both parties. The defendant undertook
to excavate extensively on his own land for a reservoir to serve
109. 34 L.J. Ex. (n.s.) 177 (1865), rev'd, Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex.
265 (1866), aff'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R., H.L. 330 (1868).
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a mill of which he was proprietor. When the excavation was
completed and partly filled, the water broke through the un-
discovered passages referred to and flooded the plaintiff's neigh-
boring mine.
The resulting controversy escaped being a simple suit for
Trespass only because the force applied by the defendant in
filling the reservoir had terminated before the water escaped.
Similarly, the claim failed as a nuisance, probably because the
injury was not a gradual offense to the senses, as was character-
istic of nuisance at that time. Had it been supportable either as
a trespass to land or as a nuisance, there would have been no
doubt that defendant's liability was absolute.
The case came on for trial at the Liverpool Summer Assizes
of 1862, and-a matter of great interest for our purpose-Bram-
well was one of the three presiding judges. The opinions clearly
betray the unsettled state of the law concerning the role of
fault at mid-century. All three Barons (Martin, Bramwell, and
Pollock) were impressed with the absence of authority on so
fundamental a question as the fault requirement, and all agreed
that some basic principle must be extricated. After reaching this
point, however, Bramwell finds himself in complete disagree-
ment with his two colleagues. Particularly is he out of accord
with Martin, who assumed the role of chief spokesman for the
requirement that fault on the part of the mill operator must be
discovered or liability must be denied.
Martin's opinion clearly indicates that he was profoundly
influenced by the collision and upset cases of the past few
decades: ". . . when damage is done to personal property, or
even to person, by a collision, either upon land or at sea, there
must be negligence in the party doing the damage to render him
legally responsible; and if there be no negligence, the party
sustaining the damage must bear with it. . . ."11 The reader
may recall that at the time of this pronouncement (1865) it
was not essential even in the traffic cases that the plaintiff show
any breach of a duty of care unless he had rejected Trespass
and had chosen Trespass on the Case. Perhaps it was with this
in mind that Martin emphasizes that Fletcher's claim could not be
brought in Trespass because the damage was not immediate, but
consequential. But does he succeed in his effort to justify the fault
110. 34 L.J. Ex. (n.s.) 177, 183 (1865).
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requirement by falling back upon the propriety of an action on
the Case? Counsel for the plaintiff had shrewdly called attention
to suits for the escape of fire and suits for the neglects of car-
riers and innkeepers, in none of which, as we know, had proof
of fault ever been required, yet all are traditionally actions
brought as Trespass on the Case. Martin's only answer here is
to dismiss each of these frequently initiated claims as being
"exceptions from the ordinary rule of law," or as resting on
"custom" (although, as we have seen, breach of some customary
obligation lies at the very root of an action on the Case).
Bramwell's opinion favoring absolute liability in Fletcher v.
Rylands is of particular interest, even though it did not prevail
at the trial. Bramwell did not attempt to recast the facts so as
to indicate that the defendant was chargeable with a trespass
(although he was not satisfied that Trespass was inappropriate
to the facts). It is immaterial, he declared, whether the water
was brought or sent upon the plaintiff's land directly or indi-
rectly. He rested his opinion upon a proposition that would be
clearly appropriate only in controversies between neighboring
landowners-the plaintiff "had a right to be free from what
has been called foreign water-that is, water artifically brought
or sent to him by its being sent to where it would flow to
him."'-' Bramwell indicated no interest in formulating some
overriding principle of fault or no-fault that could control torts
controversies in all their variety. He was content to find a
solution that would take care of this specific conflict between
neighboring uses of land.
The early collision cases that had so impressed Martin were
easily dismissed by Bramwell with the observation that both
plaintiff and defendant were in action at the time: "When two
carriages come into collision, if there is no negligence in either,
it is as much the act of one as of the other that they meet.' '1
2
It is noteworthy that the rationale for separate treatment
of highway injuries as advanced above by Bramwell is less
sophisticated than the "assumed risk of the highway" approach
that we find him adopting a decade later in Holmes v. Mather.13
The argument that negligence was appropriate because both
parties were in action on the highway might serve to set apart
111. Id. at 181.
112. Id. at 182.
113. See p. 32 mpvraL
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the collision cases by showing that the theory of Trespass was
not logically available; but it would not explain situations in
which a passive pedestrian or bystander was run down by a
moving vehicle.
We know that Bramwell's contention for absolute liability
was eventually adopted when the case was reversed by the
Exchequer Chamber.114 Blackburn, the author of the opinion on
appeal, affirmed Bramwell's thesis and made a substantial
elaboration upon it. He announced as a general principle that
whenever a person introduces upon his land any substance
whose tendency is to escape and, in escaping, to injure his neigh-
bor's property, he must restrain it at his peril. The concept of
escaping substances, comprehended under Blackburn's formula,
would include water (as particularized by Bramwell) and also
such traditional escapees as fire, cattle, and filth.
The idea of basing liability upon the act of introducing a
harmful substance into the community and thereafter failing
to keep it confined, transcended all distinctions between direct
and indirect-between Trespass and Case. It also embraced situa-
tions that were formerly actionable as "nuisances." A new
generality had indeed been born. We cannot conclude, how-
ever, that Blackburn entertained any intention of going beyond
the area of conflicts between landowners. The traffic cases would
continue to be set aside for separate treatment, requiring proof
of fault. It is here that Blackburn propounded for the first time
the assumption of risk argument which, as we know, was
later to be adopted by Bramwell in Holmes v. Mather. Black-
burn observed:
"But it was further said by Martin, B., that when
damage is done to personal property, or even to the person,
by collision, either upon land or at sea, there must be
negligence in the party doing the damage to render him
legally responsible; and this is no doubt true, as was pointed
out by Mr. Mellish during his argument before us, this
is not confined to cases of collision, for there are many cases
in which proof of negligence is essential, as for instance,
where an unruly horse gets on the footpath of a public
street and kills a passenger; . . . or where a person in a
dock is struck by the falling of a bale of cotton which the
114. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
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defendant's servants are lowering; ... and many other similar
cases may be found. But we think these cases distinguishable
from the present. Traffic on the highways, whether by land
or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing those whose
persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk; and
that being so, those who go on the highway, or have their
property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so subject
to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that
inevitable danger; and persons who by the license of the
owner pass near to warehouses where goods are being
raised or lowered, certainly do so subject to the inevitable
risk of accident. In neither case, therefore, can they recover
without proof of want of care or skill occasioning the acci-
dent; and it is believed that all the cases in which inevitable
accident has been held an excuse for what prima facie was
a trespass, can be explained on the same principle, viz.,
that the circumstances were such as to show that the plain-
tiff had taken that risk upon himself. But there is no ground
for saying that the plaintiff here took upon himself any risk
arising from the uses to which the defendants should choose
to apply their land."" 5
The story of the metamorphosis of the principle first an-
nounced by Blackburn in Rylands v. Fletcher has been told too
many times and too well to be repeated here in detail."01 It will
suffice to remind the reader that when the controversy was
appealed to the House of Lords Blackburn's notion of un-
restricted liability for escape was limited in its application to
substances and things brought onto land during the course of
a "non-natural" user. Thereafter, this cryptic term bore the
weight of a long series of policy decisions that followed. The
term, non-natural, itself, became subjected to what may be
pardonably described as a completely non-natural interpreta-
tion. It did not indicate something outside the normal course
of nature, nor did it even suggest a use or activity that was
non-rural in character. An industrial use might be regarded
115. Id. at 286.
116. Among the many excellent treatments of the Rylands v. Fletcher
development are: J. CHARLESWORTH, LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS THINGS (1922);
Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298 (1911); F.
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 344 (1926); Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1894). One of the most re-
cent and comprehensive is Prosser, The Principle of Ryland& v. Fletcher, in
SELEcTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 135 (1953).
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as natural, rather than non-natural, as in the case of mining.117
Prosser, with his happy facility of lighting upon the precise
expression, observes that uses that "have the same element of
the unusual, excessive, extravagant and bizarre" 118 are likely to
be classified as non-natural. He adds that the same term is
used to characterize "a thing or activity inappropriate to the
place where it is maintained, in the light of the character of
that place and its surroundings." 119
As a result of the natural versus non-natural distinction
drawn by Cairns in the House of Lords, the basis of liability
becomes fragmented even in the controversies between adjacent
landowners. If, in a given case, the damaging agency happened
to be fire, we must inquire further whether the flame escaped
from a domestic fireplace or whether it resulted from the
storage of quantities of combustible substances. Liability would
depend upon proof of negligence or intention in the first
instance,120 while liability would be absolute in the second situa-
tion (which involved a non-natural user),121 Again, was the
damage complained of effected through an escape of water?
If so, did the water emerge from a hydraulic power main, or
from a domestic cistern? We must determine the precise source
before we can decide whether absolute liability is or is not
appropriate. 2
2
After pondering the sequence of hearings and opinions in
Rylands v. Fletcher, we emerge with only one clear impression,
namely, that English judges at mid-nineteenth century were
still grasping with much uncertainty for some satisfactory prin-
ciple or set of principles upon which tort liability could be made
to depend. They appeared to agree that there was no single
unexceptionable basis. They were not in accord, however, even
on the matter of an acceptable starting point of fault or no-fault.
Blackburn appeared to assume that liability was essentially
absolute, and he regarded the traffic cases with their proof
of fault requirement as exceptions that depended upon the fact
117. Smith v. Kenrick, 7 C.B. 515, 137 Eng. Rep. 205 (1849).
118. Prosser, The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SELECTED Top'cS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 135, 146 (1953).
119. Id. See also Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural
User of Land, 3 CAMS. L.J. 387 (1929).
120. Sochackl v. Sas, 1 All E.R. 344 (1947).
121. Musgrove v. Pandelis, 2 K.B. 43 (1919).
122. Cf. Snow v. Whitehead, 27 Ch. D. 588 (1884) and Blake v. Land &
Home Property Corp., 3 T.L.R. 667 (Q.B. 1887).
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that the victim had assumed the risk of non-negligent injury
by venturing out into the public streets. And we know that this
same approach was evident twenty-five years later in the opinion
of Bramwell in Holmes v. Mather which we have already con-
sidered.128 Martin, on the other hand, began at the opposite end
of the spectrum. He held out the fault principle of the collision
and the running down decisions as the prototype for all liability.
He faced with indifference those recognized instances of absolute
liability, such as fire, escape of animals, and the responsibility of
carriers and innkeepers, and he shrugged them off as exceptions
resting upon timeworn custom.
When we turn to the opinion of Lord Cairns in the House of
Lords, embodying as it does the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher,
as understood in England today, we encounter difficulty in con-
cluding whether the decision should be treated as an expansion
of some earlier basic notion of strict liability, or whether, on
the contrary, it should be regarded as adding strength to the
newer postulate that fault must generally be accepted as a
prerequisite to liability. To the extent that the House of Lords
accepted Blackburn's thesis and thereby transformed what was
formerly a series of isolated rules involving fire or cattle into a
generalized principle of liability for escape, their Lordships ex-
tended the potential operative ambit of strict liability.
On the other hand, the insistence by the House of Lords
that Blackburn's principle be restricted to "non-natural" users
strongly suggests that strict liability must be regarded as rep-
resenting the exceptional situation, and is to be called into play
only when dealing with the novel or the unusual.
From mid-century onward the trend toward the fault re-
quirement became precipitous. There was emerging a new in-
dustrial society made up of men who ventured their capital on
the mass fabrication of goods in mechanized establishments and
who transported their products throughout the nation on fast
moving steam railways. Society was fast migrating to the urban
centers. There was wealth to be had and wages to be earned-
but all at high risks in terms of safety. The new society in its
dangerous world was viewed by the courts as one that was
willing to compromise safety for economic advantage; and neg-
ligence afforded the means whereby concessions could be made.
123. See p. 32 8upra,.
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A live-and-let-live postulate which was first manifest in the
early traffic cases had eventually become the attitude adopted
by an entire nation. Indeed, the pendulum of change had made
its full swing before the century expired and the courts found
themselves pressed to withhold liability for harm inflicted by
the industry and transportation enterprises even where fault
was obvious. Immunities, sharply limited duties, and elaborate
defenses were urged upon the courts, and often with considerable
success. But, that is another story.
As the century moved toward its end the dominant role to
be played by the fault principle in torts cases became fully
recognized by the courts. The requirement of blameworthiness
was accepted as though it had never been questioned. The
earlier Trespass cases imposing strict liability were lightly dis-
missed by the judges with the observation that these involved
only matters of choice between the available forms of action.
They could then proceed to observe that the reforms of the
Judiciary Act had made all such distinctions obsolete. 24 How-
ever, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, which had received
the blessing of the House of Lords, could not be so lightly dis-
missed even though its importance could be minimized. At least
by 1894, there became evident a conviction by the courts that
the Rylknds decision must be regarded with caution as repre-
senting something exceptional and possibly unwelcome. Lindley,
L.J., observed,
"That case is not to be extended beyond the legitimate
principle upon which the House of Lords decided it. If it
were extended as far as strict logic might require, it would
be a very oppressive decision."'-2 5
Lindley's observation was readily quoted by other judges.
Continued aversion to Rylands v. Fletcher, confusion as to
its meaning, and an insistence that it be confined within narrow
limits became clearly evident in the 1946 decision of the House
of Lords in Read v. J. Lyons & Co., Ltd.126 The facts fairly in-
vited an appraisal of the reach of the Rylands rule. Plaintiff
was an official inspector in defendant's factory, engaged in the
manufacture of high explosive shells. While performing her
duties within the plant she was injured by the explosion of a
124. Stanley v. Powell, L.R. 1 Q.B. 86 (1891).
125. Green v. Chelsea Water Works Co., 70 L.T. 547, 549 (1894).
126. 2 All E.R. L.R. 471 (1946).
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shell from causes unknown. Although there was no proof of
negligence, the trial judge, Cassels, held that the case was gov-
erned by Rylands v. Fletcher and he concluded that the defen-
dants were carrying on an ultrahazardous activity and hence
were responsible without reference to fault. He regarded the
principle as fundamental and as one that was applicable to all
who may deal with highly dangerous substances or objects. He
traced the parentage of the Rylands decision to the earlier rules
under which absolute liability was imposed upon the custodian
of vicious animals, and he drew liberally from Blackburn's
opinion with its broad affirmation of duty to confine dangerous
things. Cassels saw no reason why the principle should not have
general application without reference to the place of the occur-
rence or the type of harm suffered by the victim. But he was
out of step with the procession of the times. Judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Appeal, 127 and an appeal
from this reversal was dismissed by the House of Lords.128
The opinions on appeal betrayed without exception a strong
distrust of the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine. Four of the seven
judges cautiously repeated and emphasized the admonition
against extension of the principle made fifty years earlier by
Lindley, J., quoted above. One justice of the Court of Appeal
(McKinnon) fell back upon an observation of Scrutton, L.J., in
an earlier opinion, to the effect that "there are so many excep-
tions to it (Rylands and Fletcher) that it is doubtful that there
is much of the rule left.' '129 The opinions redound in expressions
of abiding faith in the fault requirement, which is now referred
to reverently as the "moral" principle, 30 while any rule imposing
absolute liability was characterized as a "medieval" notion which
"the courts in modern times have been vigilant to prevent from
breaking bounds and invading areas of the law in which it has
no place."''
Throughout the course of the opinions there is an obvious
insistence that there is no single basic principle of strict liabil-
ity:
"There are instances, no doubt, in our law in which
127. Read v. Lyons & Co., Ct. of App. 1944, 1 All E.R. 106 (1945).
128. 2 All E.R. 471 (1946).
129. St. Anne's Well Brewery Co. v. Roberts, 140 L.T. 1 (1928).
130. See, e.g., the opinion of Scott, L.J., in 1 All E.R. 106, 113 (1945).131. Id. at 119.
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liability for damage may be established apart from proof
of negligence, but it appears to be unnecessary and his-
torically incorrect to refer to all these instances as deduced
from one common principle.' 132
Despite this reassurance, no reader can escape the impres-
sion that the writers of all the opinions on appeal were aware
that from the standpoint of history they were on unsure ground.
Although they were determined to hold the line against any
further encroachments upon the territory recently taken over
by the fault principle, the variety of reasons advanced by them
for a denial of liability is surprising and revealing. Scott, L.J.,
in the Court of Appeal, emphasized the fact that Rylands v.
Fletcher involved harms between adjoining landowners and that
only persons off the premises enjoy the right of protection
against damage innocently inflicted. In the House of Lords Vis-
count Simon, L.C., found that the secret of Rylands v. Fletcher
lay in the phenomenon of escape. This, to Simon, meant escape
from a place where the defendant had occupation and control
to some other place where he does not have such occupation
and control. The fact that in the case at hand the explosive
power once confined within the shell passed violently outside
its container and worked injury to the plaintiff's person was not
"escape" as the Viscount viewed it. It was further suggested in
the same opinion that the manufacture of explosives during
wartime was not a "non-natural" user, and hence that it would
fall outside the principle as announced by the House of Lords.
Lord MacMillan adopted a still different attack. He would limit
the Rylands v. Fletcher principle to damages to property, as
opposed to personal injury. Even had the plaintiff been on
neighboring property, he observed, there could be no recovery
unless there were injury beyond that to his person.
SUIVIMMARY IN CONCLUSION
As the concept of tort liability gradually emerged from its
medieval chrysalis and became nascent in English history it
afforded little indication that the existence or nonexistence of
defendant's blameworthiness was a matter of much concern to
the law. This held not only for the early Anglo-Saxon proceed-
ing, but for its eventual successor, the suit in Trespass, and even
132. 2 All E.R. 471, 474 (1946).
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for the later developed action of Trespass on the Case. The suit
in Case, however, did introduce the notions of duty and neglect
which were destined to serve as the bases for the eventual
appearance of the negligence requirement in the traffic cases
later in the nineteenth century.
But despite the initial dominance of the idea of strict lia-
bility, there was evident almost from the beginning an intuitive
concern by courts for the defendant's blameworthiness or lack
of it. One classic seventeenth century decision, Weaver v. Ward,
suggested that the person sued might escape liability by estab-
lishing that he was "utterly without fault." Indications of a
similar concern were betrayed by allegations of "heedless" and
"careless" driving which appeared quite regularly in pleadings
in Trespass cases involving collisions even considerably prior
to the nineteenth century, although these were probably quite
unnecessary to a right to recover under that action.
In referring to the history of negligence prior to the nine-
teenth century Professor Winfield observed that "It is a skein of
threads, most of which are fairly distinct, and no matter where
we cut the skein we shall get little more than a bundle of frayed
ends.' 88 Indeed, this same observation can be made concerning
the fault picture throughout the nineteenth century and even
up to the present day in England. We are likely to gain a deeper
insight into the significance of fault (or the lack of it) by fixing
our attention upon the particular type of human activity involved
and upon the economic and social demands of the time and place
than we can gain by paying reverence to the language of the
judges as they have undertaken to serve as spokesmen for their
own society.
133. Winfleld, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q.
REv. 184, 185 (1926).
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